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Abstract  
 
This paper constructs explanatory theory on trust in e-voting, a term that refers to the use of 
stand-alone IT artefacts in voting stations. We study e-voting as a techno-organisational 
arrangement embedded in the process of elections and the broader socio-economic context 
of a country. Following a critical realist approach, we apply retroduction and retrodiction 
principles to build theory by complementing existing studies of e-voting with insights from an 
in-depth case study of elections in India. First, we seek evidence of trust in e-voting in the 
responses of the public to the announcement of election results. Then we derive the 
following four mechanisms of trust creation or loss: the association of e-voting with the 
production of positive democratic effects; the making of e-voting part of the mission and 
identity of electoral authorities; the cultivation of a positive public attitude to IT with policies 
for IT-driven socio-economic development; and, in countries with turbulent political cultures, 
a clear distinction between the experience of voting as orderly and experiences of 
malpractice in other election tasks. We suggest that these mechanisms explain the different 
experience with e-voting of different countries. Attention to them helps in assessing the 
potential of electoral technologies in countries that are currently adopting them, especially 
fragile democracies embarking upon e-voting. 
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Trusting e-voting amidst experiences of electoral malpractice: the case of 
Indian elections 
INTRODUCTION 
E-voting refers to the casting, counting and tabulating of votes with the use of electronic 
systems in polling stations of national or provincial multiparty elections and referendums 
(IDEA 2011)0Fi. With e-voting technologies, electoral management bodies (EMBs) may 
achieve better management of the logistics of elections and speedily produce election 
results (Fujiwara 2015; Hidalgo 2010). Speed of announcing results is important because 
long waiting breeds voter suspicion and, in some countries, it triggers violence. E-voting may 
reduce spoilt votes and enfranchise illiterate and certain categories of disabled citizens 
(Fujiwara 2015). It may also assist EMBs to overcome historically developed forms of 
electoral fraud (IFES 2013). But none of these benefits can be taken for granted. The use of 
e-voting technologies entails risks of mismanagement, disenfranchising voters, and 
introducing new possibilities of electoral fraud by manipulating the ICT artefacts (Loeber 
2008; Wolchok et al. 2010). 
E-voting is a contested way to conduct elections, with diverse attitudes and experiences 
around the world. In Brazil, India, Belgium, and several states of the US, elections have 
been conducted with e-voting technologies for more than ten years with widespread public 
confidence (Esteve et al. 2012; IDEA 2011; McCormack 2016). But in most countries, 
election stakeholders and public opinion towards electronic technologies have been cautious 
and sometimes decisively negative. The German High Court, for example, declared e-voting 
unconstitutional (Wynne 2009). Some countries make limited use of e-voting, only in 
municipal elections, in only some locations, or only as an option for disabled voters. Several 
countries, including the UK, Ireland, Paraguay, Bahrain, piloted e-voting technologies and 
decided not to use them (Melia et al. 2012). The Netherlands withdrew the e-voting 
machines after more than 20 years of use and returned to paper ballots (Oostveen 2010). 
Nevertheless, interest in e-voting technologies has been increasing in Asia, Africa and South 
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America (Esteve et al. 2012; IFES 2013). E-voting started being used in The Philippines in 
2010, Bhutan in 2013, Namibia in 2014, and several other countries, including Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, Nigeria, Nepal have recently been piloting such technologies. According to the 
most recent survey data available (IDEA 2015), voting machines are currently being used in 
26 countries for national or sub-national elections, or a combination of both. Eight countries 
have used e-voting in the past but withdrew it under public protestation or over different 
forms of security concerns. In 18 other countries, feasibility studies and/or tests have opened 
up the possibility of switching from current manual systems to electronic ones (IDEA 2015).  
Motivated by the puzzling diversity of public opinion about the trustworthiness of an 
information technology (IT) application that concerns one of the core institutions of 
democracy, in this paper we seek to explain what engenders public trust in e-voting. Trust is 
highlighted in the literature on elections as a particularly important condition for democracy 
(IDEA 2011; McCormack 2016; Norris 2014; Sances et al. 2014). From an information 
systems (IS) perspective, the withdrawal of voting machines and reversal to paper ballot is 
an unprecedented phenomenon of reversing an IT infrastructure for a social activity but has 
received little attention in IS research. We study e-voting as a special case of nationwide 
socio-technical systems that are part of the organisational arrangements of the state, and 
seek to understand the creation of public attitude towards them. 
We draw empirical evidence from India, which has been conducting elections with e-voting 
since 2004. Indian elections involve huge mobilisation of staff, logistics and security 
deployment: the general election in 2014 was the largest election ever conducted in history. 
Despite various malpractices, elections in India are a source of pride for the nation (Banerjee 
2007) and a model of e-voting for many developing countries (Quraishi 2014). Our empirical 
study starts with observations of voter response upon announcement of voting results – 
acceptance or protestation – which we take as evidence of public trust in e-voting or 
suspicion towards it. We then examine mechanisms that generate trust or suspicion.  
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We adopt a critical realist (CR) perspective of incremental explanatory theory building by 
analogy and retroduction. Theorising by analogy (also known as ‘retrodiction’ in the 
conceptual vocabulary of critical realism) entails ‘transforming existing cognitive resources 
into plausible theories of the mechanisms responsible for identified (typically less than strict) 
patterns of phenomena’ (Lawson 1998). Retroduction is understood as ‘positing 
mechanisms which, if they were to exist and act in the postulated matter, would account for 
phenomena singled out for explanation’ (Lawson 1998). We draw analogies from prior 
explanation of trust in e-voting in Brazil (Avgerou 2013a; Frank et al. 2017; Gonggrijp et al. 
2007b) and from research that investigated the withdrawal of e-voting in the Netherlands 
(Gonggrijp et al. 2007a; Loeber 2008; Oostveen 2010).  
In the next section we review relevant literature to identify the main concerns about e-voting. 
We then explain the theoretical foundations of our research and justify our focus on the 
formation of trust in e-voting. We frame e-voting as a socio-technical entity in the context of 
the election cycle of democratic countries. We proceed to outline our research methodology, 
which we derive from critical realism, and then present and analyse the case study of e-
voting in India. We first seek evidence of trust in e-voting, examining voters’ responses to the 
announcement of election results.  We then examine mechanisms that engender such trust, 
eliciting evidence from our field work and comparing it with existing understandings of trust in 
e-voting gained in prior research in Brazil and the Netherlands. We thus derive a 
mechanism-based causal explanation of trust in e-voting. In the conclusions, we point out 
the potential of our theoretical contribution to explain trust in other public sphere socio-
technical systems, and derive practical insights for policy makers considering e-voting. 
CONCERNS ABOUT E-VOTING 
Some governments have computerised the polling and counting process in an end-to-end 
fashion, others only parts of it. Invariably, e-voting takes place in a controlled environment in 
polling stations, polling kiosks, or other locations supervised by officers appointed by the 
EMB. Commonly used are Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines (EVMs), 
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which comprise ballot devices located in polling booths and used by voters to cast their 
votes, and a control unit in the polling station used by polling officers, on which votes are 
recorded and aggregated (IFES 2013; Wolchok et al. 2010).  
Multiple benefits are expected from voting technologies, but there are also important 
concerns about them. A summary of both and relevant literature sources are shown on 
Table 1. In this section we focus on the concerns surrounding the use of EVMs, which are 
likely to affect negatively perceptions of the trustworthiness of e-voting: their reliability for 
recording votes, the potential for fraudulent manipulation of the technologies, the extent to 
which technology allows for secrecy of individual votes and possibility for verification. 
Expected Benefits Sources 
Improved management of the logistics of the 
elections  
IDEA (2011), IFES (2013), Fujiwara (2015), 
McCormack (2016)  
Reduction in the number of null and invalid 
votes; faster production of election results 
IDEA (2011), IFES (2013), Fujiwara (2015), 
McCormack (2016) 
Enfranchisement of illiterate and disabled 
people with technologies designed for their 
needs 
Hidalgo (2010), IDEA (2011), IFES (2013), 
Fujiwara (2015) 
Potential to combat various forms of electoral 
fraud (e.g. stuffing the ballot box) 
IDEA (2011), IFES (2013), McCormack (2016) 
Increased convenience for voters Hidalgo (2010), IDEA (2011), Fujiwara (2015) 
Concerns Sources 
Difficulties in assessing reliability of the 
recording of casted votes 
Selker & Goler (2004), Stewart (2004), Loeber 
(2008), Wolchok et al. (2010), Stewart (2017) 
Lack of transparency – potential for 
fraudulent manipulation of the technologies 
Feldman et al. (2006), Gonggrijp et al. (2007), 
Wolchok et al. (2010), Halderman et al. (2015) 
Potential for violation of the secrecy of the 
votes casted 
Gritzalis (2002), Feldman et al. (2006), Gonggrijp 
et al. (2007), Loeber (2008), Wolchok et al. (2010) 
Limited possibilities to recount votes  Feldman et al. (2006), Stewart (2004), Halderman 
et al. (2015) 
New types of errors induced by voting 
machines 
Zucco and Nicolau (2016) 
Table 1 Potential benefits and concerns associated with e-voting  
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Several of the expected benefits and issues have been studied in the context of American 
elections in the aftermath of a major controversy about the extent to which maladministration 
and malfunctioning of voting technologies distorted the election outcome in the 2000 
Presidential election (Stewart 2004). Since the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the 
United States saw a massive investment in voting machines (IDEA 2011), and their diversity 
across states has provided opportunities for studying several aspects of election 
administration and voters’ attitudes (Sances et al. 2014; Selker et al. 2004; Stewart 2017).  
A major concern about EVMs is inaccurate recording of votes. Researchers of the 
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP)1Fii estimated that in the 2000 election “between 
1.5 and 2.0 million voters failed to have their vote registered because of voting machine 
failures” (Stewart 2017). Subsequent research scrutinised the design of new voting 
machines and debated the extent to which improved technologies overcome the lost votes 
problems of the 2000 elections. E-voting in Georgia, a state whose residual vote rate in the 
2000 presidential election was the second highest in the country, received a great deal of 
attention. Research by computer scientists found security vulnerabilities in the EVMs 
introduced in the subsequent election (2002) but it also found significant reductions in ‘lost 
votes’.  
Estimates of ‘lost votes’ are fraught with difficulties of causal interpretation. The commonly 
used construct of ‘residual vote’, computed as the percentage of ballots cast that did not 
record a vote in a particular race, does not separate intentional non-voting from errors or 
malfunctioning in voting machines (Alvarez 2009; Alvarez et al. 2005). Studies in other 
countries produced mixed results about the capacity of EVMs to accurately record voters’ 
preferences. In Brazil, research showed that EVMs have in many elections reduced the 
number of common errors that result in ‘spoilt votes’ (Fujiwara 2015).  But voting with EVMs 
seems to have created new complications. Zucco and Nicolau (2016) argued that electronic 
technology in Brazil, while reducing the number of spoilt votes, caused a sharp rise in party-
label votes (votos de legenda) i.e. votes for parties rather than individual candidates. 
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Beyond technical malfunctioning that may cause problems for accurate recording of voters’ 
preference, computer scientists frequently also voice concern about the vulnerability of e-
voting systems to manipulation by insider agents or external hackers (Feldman et al. 2006; 
Halderman et al. 2015; Wolchok et al. 2010). Vote rigging is an ever present threat in all 
countries, including long established democracies (Caro 1990). E-voting opens new avenues 
for fraud by manipulating the software and hardware components of voting machines. 
Secrecy about the software and hardware design is often presented as a mechanism to 
protect EVMs from hacker tampering. Computer security experts challenge the prudence of 
such policy, and concerns about malicious hacking are more acute in systems provided by 
commercial vendors who do not allow access to test their systems software claiming 
copyright protection (Loeber 2008; Moynihan 2004). 
Another major concern is whether EVMs protect vote secrecy. To ensure that votes are cast 
freely, the voting systems should not make it possible to trace links between vote and voter. 
Several technical features, such as automated authentication procedures and a voting time 
recording function in the control unit, may make it possible to trace voters’ identity (Gritzalis 
2002). An apparently opposite concern is the need for the possibility of verification that votes 
cast are recorded as the voter intended. The need to reconcile secrecy and verifiability is 
one of the most salient features of e-voting, and the one that makes it unique in the 
landscape of IT applications. IT applications are normally constructed in such a way that 
output-based verification is possible: for example, if customers are not sure about the 
reliability of a banking transaction system, they can check their account statement to ensure 
all transactions have been properly recorded. But the importance of secrecy of the vote, 
which is a central feature of elections in democracies (Pastor 1999) requires the obliteration 
of any connection between the voter’s identity and the vote cast. The absence of a paper 
trail makes it hard to convince the voter of the reliability of the system, and removes the 
option of recounting for verification: 
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(…) breaking the link between voter and vote means that the examination of an e-voting system 
after an election cannot prove directly that every vote was indeed counted and tallied as cast. 
This is why indirect proofs of the validity of the electronic results, such as paper trails or system 
certification are important. Without such mechanisms, manipulated or incorrect results produced 
by an e-voting system could remain undetected for a long time. (IDEA 2011) 
Thus, a core issue in the debate on the merits of e-voting is the presence or not of a paper 
trail, or VVPAT, to provide a physical record of the voters’ choices. By manually recounting 
the VVPAT receipts, the results presented by the voting system can be independently 
checked, and the results of an election can be verified by a manual recount from a random 
sample of polling stations (IDEA 2011). But VVPAT has problems too (Ansari et al. 2008). 
Selker and Goler (2004) found potential problems with ergonomics, logistics, security, fraud 
and mechanical fragilities of paper trail machines.  
Few technology and elections experts who highlight and analyse technology vulnerabilities 
and security risks of e-voting systems call for an altogether banning of EVMs in elections. 
Most tend to suggest combinations of technology features and organisational measures to 
make them more reliable and secure (Shahandashti et al. 2016; Volkamer 2009; Xenakis et 
al. 2005). Technology fixes include improvements of screen design to avoid user errors, 
encryption, and the provision of VVPAT (Ansari et al. 2008); organisational measures 
include tests of the accurate recording of votes during the deployment of the technology 
(Ganz et al. 2016; McCormack 2016). Drawing mostly from the experience of the use of 
EVMs in the US, Moynihan (2004) concludes: 
(…) there is no such thing as a completely secure electronic system, and therefore e-voting will 
never be error free. However, given current trends in the adoption of DREs, it may be better to 
seek a system that moves DRE towards high reliability rather than rejecting technology that will 
be adopted anyway. (p. 526) 
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STUDIES OF TRUST IN VOTING TECHNOLOGIES 
While the technical and organisational characteristics of e-voting rightly attract scrutiny and 
discussion, the literature on elections also highlights the significance of voters’ trust (IDEA 
2011; McCormack 2016; Norris 2014; Sances et al. 2014). Suspicion of maladministration or 
fraud in voting leads citizens to doubt whether the election results are an accurate 
representation of cast votes, consequently causing doubts about the legitimacy of elected 
governments (Norris 2014). We assume a continuum between complete trust and complete 
suspicion, rather than a binary of trust and mistrust. We take trust to be the perception of the 
trustworthiness of a system. As such, trust is not a direct reflection of trustworthiness 
properties of a system and requires careful research to understand the way it is manifested 
and the way it is produced or damaged (Avgerou 2013a; Gandhi 2014; Gonggrijp et al. 
2007b; Oostveen et al. 2004; Oostveen et al. 2005; Verma 2005). We take trust to be an 
enacted cognitive state of voters, which is associated with their life experiences of interaction 
with multiple actors embedded in the political and socio-economic context of a country 
(Weick 1988). 
Often research in e-voting refers to confidence rather than trust. The difference between 
trust and confidence has been debated in economics, sociology and political science 
(Luhmann 2000; Newton et al. 1999; Tonkiss 2009). A generally accepted view is that trust 
is a matter of a risky choice while confidence does not presuppose perception of risk and 
does not involve a choice over alternatives (Pieters 2006). In our research we assume that 
trust is an appropriate concept because people have a choice of action based on their 
perception of its trustworthiness. Non-trust is evidenced by action that challenges the 
election arrangements, non-participation in voting, or challenge of election results. Another 
distinction between trust and confidence is made by Newton and Norris (1999), who use the 
term trust to refer to interpersonal relations, and confidence to refer to institutions. 
Nevertheless, the term ‘political trust’ is widely used in political science to refer to trust in 
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institutions, e.g. the police, parliament, army, and this is the notion we adopt in this paper  
(Avgerou 2013a). 
Evidence about citizens’ trust, or confidence in e-voting has been sought through public 
opinion surveys. Some studies that compare EVMs to traditional voting methods find high 
levels of confidence and indeed user preference for e-voting (Alvarez et al. 2011). In the 
aftermath of the 2000 election in the US, Everett et al. (2008) find significantly greater user 
satisfaction with EVMs as compared to traditional paper ballots. Several hypotheses about 
factors contributing to voters’ confidence about election results have been tested with survey 
data, including satisfaction with the outcome of the elections and confidence in voting 
technologies. Sances et al (2014), for example, examine 30 national surveys and, among 
other findings, they note that voters seem to be more confident when the type of ballot 
technology used in their country remains the same from election to election.  
When available, public survey data provide useful indicators of levels of trust and evidence 
to test the validity of various postulated hypotheses about conditions that engender trust. But 
data on public attitude towards e-voting are lacking in many countries; they are lacking in 
India, Brazil, and most other countries using or planning to use e-voting. More importantly, 
survey data on a complex concept such as trust in e-voting hide ambiguities of interpretation 
of responses. Ambiguities may stem from perceptions of the object of trust in e-voting – for 
example whether responders are aware of the voting machine embedded in a political 
context (Pieters 2006), or of the technical features of the voting machine and of alternatives 
(Smith 2016). Surveys of opinions on trust may not correspond to subsequent behaviour that 
involves trust or suspicion. Often responders indicate in surveys mistrust towards an 
institution, for example to a particular type of schools, while they voluntarily continue to 
prefer them to alternatives (O'Neill 2002). Public surveys of citizens’ opinions without 
adequate causal explanation that associates attitudes towards e-voting with contextual 
conditions may produce misleading indicators of trust. Indicatively, some surveys of 
perceptions of e-voting in the Netherlands in the mid-2000s, showed highly positive attitudes 
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to e-voting, in contrast to the wave of suspicion that led to the withdrawal of the systems and 
reversal to paper ballot in 2006 (Oostveen et al. 2005; Oostveen 2010). 
Following methodological guidelines for critical realist research, our case study approach is 
best suited to trace such causal context-specific processes of trust creation. It allows us to 
examine the way technology artefacts come to produce effects in relation to their immediate 
setting of use as well as broader historically formed circumstances and socio-political 
institutions. 
THEORETICAL FRAMING OF THE STUDY  
The functionality of the artefacts used for voting, the easiness of their use, their security 
features, robustness or propensity for malfunctioning  (Altman et al. 2002; Kallinikos 2012; 
Selker et al. 2004; Stewart 2004) are all important contributors to the conduct of voting and 
voters’ perception of the trustworthiness of elections. But an explanation of organisational 
and social phenomena involving IT on the basis of technology properties alone is too limited 
(Markus et al. 1988). To explain phenomena involving IT artefacts, human-computer-
interaction (HCI) research looks beyond the artefact and draws from social theories to 
consider the context of their use (Dourish 2004; Nardi 1996). In IS, theory on the socio-
technical (or socio-material) nature of phenomena involving technology suggests that 
explanations should consider not only the material properties and the digital functionality of 
technology artefacts but also the way these make sense to people and are enacted in the 
context of organisational processes (Leonardi et al. 2012; Markus et al. 2008; Mutch 2010; 
Orlikowski 2007; Volkoff et al. 2007). In this study, we take the object of trust to be a socio-
technical entity of the cycle of elections, embedded in a country’s political institutions and 
socio-economic conditions. 
A socio-technical perspective of e-voting shifts the focus on the material properties of EVMs 
to the way they are deployed in polling stations, supervised, and enacted in specific 
elections. E-voting in our study is a techno-organisational arrangement embedded in the 
political and socio-economic context of a country or region. It comprises technology 
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mediated practices organised by EMBs in relation to other actors involved in the processes 
of e-voting, such as technology service providers, political party representatives, election 
observers, the media, etc. The object of trust in our research is a voting technology 
intertwined with the regulated practice of a government organisation, the EMB, in a country’s 
election processes.  
A critical realist perspective provides a theoretical basis for expanding the context 
considered in the explanation of a phenomenon beyond the organisational actors involved in 
the socio-technical configurations of voting and counting to examine broader processes and 
institutions that influence the formation of the phenomenon (Archer 2003; Dobson et al. 
2013; Njihia et al. 2013). 
Most relevant for explaining voters’ perceptions and behaviour in elections concern the state 
of a country’s democracy. (Altman et al. 2002; Beetham et al. 2008; Schmitter et al. 1991). 
Elections are a core aspect of a democratic regime, closely related to other institutions of 
democracy, such as citizenship and civil rights, as well as the socio-economic, cultural and 
political conditions enabling or inhibiting the effective performance of democratic institutions. 
Among the socio-economic conditions that restrict effective enactment of democratic 
principles of equality and liberty are illiteracy, poverty, and cultural traditions of discrimination 
of certain categories of citizens, as in the Indian caste system. 
The most immediate aspect of the context of a country’s democracy for the socio-technical 
e-voting system is the process of elections. In the next section we draw from the literature of 
political science to understand what it entails.  
The electoral cycle 
The notion of electoral cycle refers to the activities that recur between an election and the 
next one. The cycle comprises several stages “from the design and drafting of legislation, 
the recruitment and training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the 
registration of political parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the electoral 
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campaign, polling, counting, the tabulation of results, the declaration of results, the resolution 
of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing and archiving” (Norris 2013a, p. 567). Articulating 
the stages of the cycle provides a basis for assessing ‘well functioning elections’ and for 
identifying electoral malfunctioning (Bjornlund 2004; Elklit et al. 2005). Influential in the 
debate of what constitutes well-functioning elections is the normative theory of electoral 
integrity (Birch 2011; Norris 2013b) which elaborates global norms and standards governing 
the conduct of elections, including procedural correctness of all election stages.  
Electoral malpractice refers to violation of electoral integrity. Norris (2013a) distinguishes 
first-order malpractice, involving for example deadly violence and human rights violations, 
from second-order, involving more mundane issues of maladministration. Although first-order 
malpractice usually attracts greater media attention (Bratton 2008; Dercon et al. 2012; Smith 
2009), second-order malpractice can significantly affect voters’ perception of electoral 
integrity. It concerns administrative deficiencies of diverse kinds, ranging from exclusion of 
entitled citizens from the electoral rolls to errors in voter authentication and vote counting 
(Birch 2011; Piccolino 2015; Piccolino 2016). Fraud occurring on the polling day is a small 
part of the all-encompassing election process and the range of issues that may compromise 
the extent to which election results represent citizens’ preferences. 
The model of electoral integrity (Figure 1) provides the rationale for associating 
trustworthiness of e-voting, as an aspect of electoral integrity, with public trust and 
acceptance of election results. This relationship is often expressed in negative terms of 
malpractices and their consequences:  Election malpractices create perceptions that 
elections are fraudulent and damage citizens’ trust in the electoral institutions or processes, 
leading to protests challenging the legitimacy of election results. 
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Figure 1 The model of electoral integrity.  
Source: adapted from Norris (2014: 11) 
 
We draw the following assumptions from this model of electoral integrity: if voters perceive 
the elections as politically legitimate and participate in voting, depending on whether they 
trust e-voting they will accept election results or they will protest, either peacefully or 
violently. Voter protests, however, either prior or after the election day, may be caused by 
doubts of political legitimacy and discontent with other aspects of the election cycle. A 
challenge for the study of trust in e-voting is the disentangling of the various public concerns 
expressed in post-election observed action. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our case study aims to identify and explain citizens’ trust or suspicion in e-voting in India by 
following a methodology informed by critical realism, a general theory which provides a 
rationale for developing empirically supported causal explanations. According to critical 
realism, observed phenomena are a subset of possibilities that may occur from the 
enactment of causal powers and structures of entities existing in the ‘real world’ 
independently of human perception (Lawson 1998; Mingers et al. 2013; Smith 2006; Wynn 
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et al. 2012; Zachariadis et al. 2013). A causal explanation is constructed by identifying 
generative mechanisms, that is, by ‘detailing the means or processes by which events are 
generated by structures, actions, and contextual conditions involved in a particular setting’ 
(Wynn et al. 2012).  
Mechanisms are often unobservable. We infer their existence from examining observed 
phenomena, their constituent elements and their context, and making assumptions of causal 
associations between them. Often multiple possible sets of interacting mechanisms are 
empirically detected and, in such cases, the researcher has to compare their explanatory 
power and to judge which ones are supported by empirical evidence. In any case, 
mechanism-based explanation is inherently incomplete and non-generalisable across 
contextual settings. Most of the times there are complementary mechanisms that interact 
with the ones manifested in an empirical study. Also, detected mechanisms in one case may 
not be activated under different contextual conditions.  
Although, according to critical realism, phenomena are rarely replicated in an identical form 
across contexts, similar contextual settings may give rise to ‘demi-regularities’ of causal 
mechanisms. Mechanisms explaining the formation of a socio-technical phenomenon in one 
setting provide plausible hypotheses for investigation of similar phenomena in a similar 
setting. We build theory by hypothesising the existence of mechanisms in a specific context 
and seeking empirical evidence for their validity. ‘Best suited’ for theory development in 
critical realist research are case studies, although quantitative methods can be used to 
identify causal mechanisms occurring in multiple contexts and assess their validity (Dobson 
2001; Easton 2010; Wynn et al. 2012; Zachariadis et al. 2013). Findings from case studies 
can incrementally contribute to theory building by describing mechanisms in conceptual 
terms (Lee et al. 2003), which are subsequently validated and refined in other cases of 
similar contexts. 
According to the methodological principles suggested by Wynn and Williams (2012), a 
general structure for a critical realist case study is as follows: 
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1. The starting point is an observation of a phenomenon to be explained. 
2. Description of the phenomenon in terms of constituent components and its context. 
3. Hypothesised mechanisms that generated the phenomenon in the specific context of 
the study. In the terminology of critical realism, the identification of plausible 
explanation is called retroduction if the mechanisms are inferred by thinking what 
processes and conditions may have brought about the observed phenomenon, and 
retrodiction if mechanisms are hypothesised by analogy, having been identified 
before in other similar settings. In other words, retroduction identifies new 
mechanisms, while retrodiction examines the validity of already known mechanisms 
in a new setting. 
4. Analytical assessment of the validity of the hypothesised mechanisms; consideration 
of alternative explanations; selection of combinations that offer the most satisfactory 
explanation. Analysis draws from multiple data sources, triangulating evidence and 
enriching insights from multiple points of view to strengthen the validity of causal 
claims. 
5. Theoretical stock taking; generative mechanisms across contexts. 
Following the critical realist epistemology and methodological guidance, our research aims 
to explain the way contextual conditions create public trust in e-voting. But both trust and the 
mechanisms that generate it are unobservable. In this research we infer the existence of 
trust in polling results produced by e-voting from the observation of public acceptance of or 
disputes and protests over the election outcomes. We then identify mechanisms that explain 
the creation of citizens have confidence that the election results produced by the socio-
technical entity of e-voting are a faithful account of the preferences of the electorate. 
Thus, more specifically, in the case study of Indian e-voting, the starting point is the 
observation of public responses when election results are announced. Then we construct a 
two-stage explanation, involving two sets of hypotheses and analytical assessments. The 
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first hypothesis is that e-voting is highly trusted in India. We confirm by retroduction that 
observations of public responses to election results in India suggest the existence of trust in 
e-voting. We then hypothesise mechanisms explaining the production of trust in the Indian e-
voting. We do so by a combination of retrodiction, seeking evidence to corroborate the 
validity of mechanisms identified in other cases (Avgerou 2013a; Loeber 2008; Oostveen et 
al. 2004), and retroduction, identifying an additional mechanism from the study of the Indian 
elections. 
Data collection 
We chose to study e-voting in India because of its reputation as a successful case of EVM 
use in nationwide and state elections since 2004. We started with a literature review to 
familiarise ourselves with the political history of India since independence, in particular the 
history of its elections (Banerjee 2007; Banerjee 2014; Corbridge et al. 2000; Corbridge et al. 
2005; Quraishi 2014). The scale of election operations and complexity of this context of e-
voting, the mix of very large numbers of socio-economically disadvantaged with an 
increasingly large middle class and a sizable privileged group, and differences among states 
and regions make it an extreme case as far as the organisational effort of e-voting is 
concerned.  
We drew data from multiple sources, listed in the Appendix. Primary data were collected 
over three research visits in April 2015, August-September 2015 and May 2016.  During the 
first two visits, we conducted interviews with electoral officers, engineers who worked in the 
companies that designed and produce the EVMs, members of political parties, journalists, 
political scientists, civil society activists and voters in the states of Karnataka and Kerala. 
Voters were interviewed in multiple contexts. We also triggered conversations with personal 
acquaintances in public places, such as tea stalls and street markets, to elicit perceptions of 
e-voting by the general public.  
We thus formed a general understanding of Indian elections, the social and historical context 
in which they occur, the range of technologies utilised for their conduct, and the electoral 
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management bodies running them. These first visits confirmed the impression we had 
formed from secondary sources that there is a widespread positive attitude towards e-voting 
among voters, political parties and electoral observers. This finding is all the more interesting 
because it became also clear from our reading and interviews that Indian elections are not 
free from malpractice. First order malpractice is common in most states and in some areas 
there is serious electoral violence before and after the election day.   
Our third visit took us to New Delhi; Kolkata and Nandigram in West Bengal; Trivandrum in 
Kerala, and again Bangalore in Karnataka to explore the relationship of different post-
election indicators (peaceful results acceptance or protests) and generative mechanisms of 
trust in e-voting. We chose to study closely e-voting in the legislative assembly elections of 
Kerala and West Bengal for two reasons. The first is that these two states are characterised 
by a high level of political participation, the second is that they differ in their political 
mobilisation, including their histories of polling and protest. Attention to these two conditions 
is important for interpreting observed responses to the announcement of election results. We 
realised in our preliminary research that we needed to disentangle trust in e-voting from 
indifference  and intimidation as alternative explanations in cases of peaceful acceptance of 
election results, and suspicion towards e-voting from anger related with other electoral 
malpractices in cases of post-election protests. 
Political participation is a form of civic engagement that leads citizens to become involved 
with political life, ‘intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various 
levels of the political system’ (Conge 1988).  If the level of political participation in a state is 
high, we expect the electorate to be aware of e-voting and alert about malpractice, including 
potential problems occurring in e-voting. If therefore results are accepted without protests, 
we can assume this is a sign of trust in the voting arrangements rather than a sign of 
citizens’ apathy or intimidation. By political mobilisation we refer to the history of struggle for 
socio-economic development, including party politics and class-based movements. 
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Understanding the form of citizens’ political struggle is important for the analysis of observed 
protests and violence at the announcement of election results.   
Political participation, characterised by the prominence of the Left, is very high in both states, 
but their histories of political mobilisation are different. Kerala is widely known for its high 
rankings in social development and civic engagement (Heller 1996; Véron 2001), whereas 
West Bengal has had a more complicated development history with lower attainments 
(Mallick 2007). In particular, West Bengal is renowned for episodes of turbulence over the 
last decades (Sinharay 2014) and is often depicted as a hotbed of armed booth capturing. 
While the voters and academic researchers we interviewed sustain that cases of booth 
capturing have diminished after the introduction of EVMs, electoral violence still occurs in the 
state.  Indicatively, the 2011 state assembly election ended with 34,000 people detained, 24 
killed, and hundreds injured in street battles.2Fiii Similarly, in elections for municipal 
corporations in 2015 there were incidents of gunfire around polling stations and the media 
reported that several electoral booths were attacked with arms.3Fiv A violent climate was hence 
expected for the 2016 legislative assembly election too.4Fv This limited our access to the 
polling stations on the election day. We were able to interview voters and local academics 
during and after the election day, but high security presence around polling stations 
prevented us from getting permission to observe voting activity and to interview voting 
facilitators on duty. 
In contrast, Kerala elections are known to be largely, but not entirely, trouble-free. While 
elections are peaceful in most of the state, there is a history of political violence in the north 
of the state since 1971, with the town of Kannur as the epicentre of clashes between the 
Hindu Right, the Muslim League and the Marxist Left (Chaturvedi 2011). Kerala's Crime 
Records Bureau estimates that at least 100 people have been murdered and many more 
injured in political violence during elections in the last 10 years in the area of Kannur.  
We observed the last day of the campaign in Trivandrum for the legislative assembly 
elections of Kerala on 16th May, visited a polling station on the election day where we 
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interviewed political party representatives and polling station staff, and talked informally with 
voters. On the day of the vote counting, on 19th May, and the following two days we 
interviewed voters and party representatives in Trivandrum, we watched the news on various 
TV channels and read newspapers.  
As our empirical study progressed and our understanding of the object of interest unfolded, 
interview questions became increasingly more specific. Interviews were framed initially as a 
means to discover, and later in the research, as a means to validate explanations emerging 
from our analysis. We gradually focused our attention on two types of interviewees. One is 
voters belonging to political party organisations, which include people from all social classes. 
The other is voters living in disadvantaged socioeconomic contexts, for which we visited a 
civic organisation in Bangalore, two organisations (a governmental one and an NGO) 
working with vulnerable communities in Trivandrum and one of the slum colonies where 
such organisations operate. Our interviews spanned a large range of ages, from young 
voters who casted their first vote using the EVMs in the 2014 General Election to older 
voters who had experience of the paper-ballot based elections held before the introduction of 
e-voting. 
We produced descriptions on four key aspects of Indian elections: the context in which 
elections are run, both at the national and at the state level; technologies of voting and 
counting as well as technologies for registration and voter authentication; and the voting 
processes on the election day, as we observed in polling stations of Trivandrum, Kerala. 
 
STARTING POINT: OBSERVATION OF RESPONSES TO E-VOTING RESULTS 
In May 2016, we observed the state legislative assembly elections in Trivandrum, capital of 
the state of Kerala. There were 1204 candidates from 52 political parties contesting elections 
throughout the state. There was a turnout rate of 77.35%, the highest ever registered in the 
state. The two main coalitions in Kerala are the United Democratic Front (UDF), led by the 
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Indian National Congress, and the Left Democratic Front (LDF), led by the Communist Party 
of India (CPI-M). The 2016 election was won by the LDF with an unusually large margin of 
91 seats, vs. the 47 gained by the UDF. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which rules the 
country since 2014, gained one seat - they never had a seat in the Keralan parliament 
before this election.  
In Trivandrum, the results produced by e-voting were duly accepted by election 
stakeholders: voters, official observers, political parties, and the media. The LDF victory was 
anticipated by most commentators according to a pattern of alternating into power that 
characterises Kerala. Since 1982, Kerala’s State Assembly election results have followed an 
anti-incumbency pattern, in which the coalition in power has been voted out by the other 
coalition at the next round. LDF victory celebrations took place, but in an orderly way and 
without noticeable instances of violence. Even the BJP celebrated its victory of obtaining 
their first seat ever in the Keralan parliament. Party activists roamed around the streets 
carrying party flags, made stands on the roadside, and publicly celebrated, without incidents 
or police intervention in Trivandrum districts.  
The post-election situation was different in North Kerala, where violence erupted upon the 
announcement of the election results:  
The violence began within hours of the May 19 election results. That day, RSS5Fvi workers 
allegedly attacked CPI(M) victory processions in different parts of Kannur district in which 
one person was killed and eight others injured. The retaliation was swift. CPI(M) cadres 
allegedly burnt down houses of RSS workers. The Bharatiya Janata Party took the battle 
to Delhi on May 22, trying to reach AKG Bhavan, the CPI(M) headquarters. Six hundred 
BJP workers were detained.6Fvii 
In West Bengal, where we interviewed voters and academics on the election day and in its 
immediate aftermath, the overall turnout was 83%, one of the highest in the state’s history. 
The elections campaign was marked by an increase in political violence which was 5 times 
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higher compared to the rest of the year (32 vs.6 events per week)7Fviii. Clashes among political 
parties continued after the election day in several constituencies: 
A day after polls took place in Howrah, six houses were damaged and a shop set on fire, 
with both CPM8Fix and TMC blaming each other. After Kolkata had voted, families of CPM 
workers and polling agents across the constituency were allegedly beaten up and their 
homes were vandalised. Thirteen persons were injured in various incidents of post-poll 
violence in South 24 Parganas district.9Fx 
Voters in Kolkata that we spoke to during and after election day predicted violence in parts of 
the state on announcement of the results, and that is what happened: when the results were 
announced, nine people were injured by a bomb at a victory parade of the winning party at 
Kipalpur. The state secretary of CPM claimed that over 500 party offices were set on fire and 
houses of CPM leaders were attacked in several districts and Kolkata, and a Left Front 
delegation marched to the Kolkata police headquarters to protest against the post-election 
violence.  
Given these observations, the challenge for our research is to disentangle public attitude to 
e-voting from attitude to other aspects of the elections. Is it valid to interpret lack of disputes 
of the election results, as in Trivandrum, as indication of trust in e-voting, or are there are 
other explanations of acceptance of election results without protestations? To what extent 
were the incidents of post-election protests and violence in the states we visited due to 
suspicion towards the trustworthiness of e-voting, or due to discontent with other aspects of 
the elections?  
DESCRIPTION OF THE PHENOMENON IN TERMS OF CONSTITUENT COMPONENTS 
AND ITS CONTEXT 
The elections context 
The EMB of India is a three-member agency, the Election Commission of India (ECI), 
consisting of a Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and two election commissioners. The 
commissioners are appointed for up to six years by the President, on the recommendation of 
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the Prime Minister. So far, the suitability of the persons appointed for these roles has not 
been an issue in Indian politics, although there are suggestions for a more inclusive 
selection process that will involve also the opposition parties in Parliament and 
representatives of other state institutions (Quraishi 2014). The ECI oversees the preparation 
of electoral rolls and conducts elections for the two houses of parliament and state legislative 
assemblies. The commissioners are assisted by a Secretariat of about 350 staff. At the state 
level, State Election Commissions are headed by Chief Electoral Officers appointed by the 
ECI in consultation with the state government. But the tasks of voter registration and the 
conduct of elections involve millions of personnel, who are drawn from central and local 
government employees, most of them for a limited period of time during elections. It is 
estimated that it takes eleven million polling and security staff to conduct general elections.  
India is a federation of 29 states and seven special territories, where elections take place at 
three levels. First, every five years a national election is held for the Lower House of 
Parliament (Lok Sabha), in which 543 members are elected through a first-past-the-post 
system. Second, every five years there are also elections for the members of state 
legislative assemblies (MLAs), distributed in different months and years for different states. 
Third, elections are conducted for municipal and village bodies, at different points in time for 
different states. With a population of more than 1.3 billion, the organisation of elections is a 
massive effort. In the 2014 general elections, there were 834 million registered voters, of 
whom 554 million voted at 931,986 polling booths. Elections occur in many phases to 
facilitate the movement of electoral staff and security.  
Indian elections have a global reputation of ‘moderate’ integrity, turnout is high and has 
grown over the decades, leading to the highest turnout in the last Lok Sabha election in 
2014 (66.38%)10Fxi. The general perception is that elections are the defining feature of the 
exercise of democracy in India, mobilizing citizens from all classes and castes (Ahuja et al. 
2012; Banerjee 2014). Nevertheless, malpractice of both first and second order is widely 
24 
 
present, although the intensity and type of malpractice vary substantially across states. An 
ex-Chief Election Commissioner describes first order problems as follows:  
Pre-election conflicts are primarily concerned with fidelity issues and possible manipulations in 
electoral rolls, while those during the election campaigning period include disruption of 
opponents’ campaigns, intimidation of candidates and voters and a general atmosphere of threat 
and violence. The poll day conflicts comprise preventing people from voting, violence at or 
around polling stations, booth capturing and rigging, damage to electoral voting machines and 
threat to election personnel. Post-election tensions include counting day conflicts, victimization of 
voters and clashes between the winners and losers. (Quraishi 2014) 
The ECI has taken multiple actions to prevent electoral malpractice. Most important among 
them have been the development and enforcement of rules about posting administrative 
personnel deputed for election duties away from the place of their permanent position to 
avoid influence from their favourite parties or candidates; compulsory submission of 
candidates’ affidavits (disclosing information about criminal records, education, wealth, etc); 
compulsory disclosure of party campaign expenses; a code of conduct about political parties’ 
campaigning; election observers in charge of monitoring adherence to the code of conduct; 
pre-election alcohol bans, armed guarding of polling stations; and the introduction of 
technologies for the preparation of electoral rolls, voter authentication, casting and counting 
votes (Verma 2009). 
The Indian EVM 
In India, the design of the EVMs was based on a machine built to run trade union elections in 
a state-owned company, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), in the early 1980s. EVMs were 
first used in the Paravoor constituency of Kerala in 1982. In 1989, following the 
recommendations of an electoral reform committee, the electoral law was amended by 
Parliament to allow the use of EVMs, and these were gradually introduced in elections 
around the nation since 1998. Since the Lok Sabha election in 2004, e-voting has become 
mandatory in all elections. EVMs are manufactured by BEL and another state-owned 
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company, the Electronic Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), based in Hyderabad. At the 
time of writing the ECI owns more than 11 million EVMs, of three different generations, the 
latest of which released in 2006-2007. 
The Indian EVM consists of a ballot and a control unit, connected by a 5-meter cable. Prior 
to the election day, each key on the ballot unit is marked with the name of a candidate and 
the symbol of their party. Recognition by symbols is particularly important, as India has a 
high illiteracy rate amounting to 25.6%, particularly so in the rural and tribal areas. The 
feature that sets the Indian design apart from other EVMs is that the software is provided as 
firmware, meaning that it is encoded in the EVM’s EPROM (Erasable Programmable Read-
Only Memory). EVMs are used for both the voting and the counting phases. Votes are cast 
and stored within the machine itself, which is then brought to counting centres where votes 
from the machines are aggregated and tabulated.  
 
Figure 2 The Indian EVM.  
Source: Wikipedia 
Incidents of blatant machine malfunctioning, such as adding all votes to one party, although 
isolated and very rare among the hundreds of thousands of deployed machines, raise 
concern about undetected malfunctioning and the possibility of malicious tampering. The 
security of the Indian EVMs has repeatedly caused controversy (Herstatt et al. 2017; Rao 
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2010). Several political parties made allegations of machine tampering in the 2009 national 
elections as well as after the 2016 state legislature election in Utter Pradesh. A civil society 
initiative, VeTA (Citizens for Verifiability, Transparency, and Accountability in Elections) 
comprising computer security experts, political scientists, legal professionals and activists 
challenged the EVMs as insecure, bearing potential for rigging.  
Challengers of the Indian EVM security managed to acquire and inspect a machine. A study 
by Wolchok et al. (2010), of an EVM used in the 2009 Lok Sabha election, argues that the 
machine can in principle be hacked in at least two ways, consisting respectively in a violation 
of vote security and in an arbitrary modification of the results11Fxii. The study found technical 
fragilities that could in principle be exploited with malicious intent. One of the authors of the 
study, a security scientist based in the US that we interviewed, told us that the attacks 
demonstrated in the study can be performed by substituting key components of the 
machine’s circuit. Hackers would, however, need to break into ‘strongrooms’, the heavily 
protected with locks and guns buildings where the machines are stored. 
The Indian election process 
Before elections, voters need to register in the electoral rolls. Registration happens locally, at 
the state election commission (SEC). A person eligible to vote should register at his/her 
place of residence, or online if such type of registration is available in the state12Fxiii. It is the 
responsibility of the voter to transfer his/her registration within and across states upon 
change of place of residence, up to three to four months ahead of a forthcoming election. 
Election dates for general and state elections are announced by the ECI, usually between 
two and three months before the election days. Upon announcement of election dates, a 
code of conduct is released by the ECI, to which political parties and candidates have to 
abide. The code of conduct provides rules with respect to the electoral campaign and polling 
day. Election observers are assigned to constituencies on a random basis to minimise the 
risk of threats and intimidation by local party loyalists. 
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EVMs are kept in guarded storage. Before elections machines are checked by the 
manufacturers, BEL or ECIL, and a mock poll of at least a thousand votes is done in 5% of 
units, randomly selected by the political parties. Machines are paper-sealed, signed by the 
parties, and given a unique number. They are then randomly allocated to assembly 
constituencies, and when transported there they are prepared with ballot papers on the 
balloting units showing the symbols of contesting parties.  They are mock tested again and 
thread-sealed. They are randomly allocated to polling stations and stored in a strongroom till 
the day of the election, when, at the presence of candidates and the election observers they 
are dispatched to the polling stations. Before polling begins, the presiding officer does a 
mock poll of at least 100 votes in the presence of the candidates or their authorised agents, 
and the machines are again sealed for the third time. If the mock poll is unsuccessful, a new 
EVM has to be requested, which may lead to repolling for that particular station. 
On election day, voting stations open 7am-7pm, and each station has several polling booths 
inside. Each booth houses electoral officers, as well as political party representatives and 
one EVM. Voters queue and enter a voting booth when a first election officer completes the 
identification process, checking the voter’s card against the printout register for the booth. A 
second officer crosses out the voter’s name in the printout, asks them to sign the register 
against their name, and marks their right index finger with an impermeable ink line. A third 
officer then unlocks the EVM, using the control unit attached to it. The voter proceeds to use 
the machine behind a screen, presses the button corresponding to the candidate name of 
their choice, and a sound signal is heard confirming that vote has happened. The voter then 
leaves the booth, supervised by a fourth officer.  
At the closing time of polling stations, the polling officer in charge of the control unit presses 
the 'close' key, preventing the EVM from accepting any more votes. The machines are 
placed in plastic boxes and are taken to the strongroom, where they are kept under armed 
police guard till the day scheduled for the vote count. The machines are brought to the 
counting centres, which are usually located in public buildings but accessible only by the 
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election staff in charge. Pressing the ‘results’ key on each EVM reveals a sequence of 
outputs: the number of candidates, the total votes, and then the number of votes received by 
each candidate, from the highest to the lowest. These results are manually recorded from 
each machine, and aggregated to determine final results, usually within a few hours. 
 
STAGE 1: ESTABLISHING A CASE OF TRUST IN E-VOTING 
HYPOTHESIZING TRUST IN E-VOTING  
There are various indications that e-voting is widely trusted in India. To begin with, the 
remarkably high level of trust in the ECI shown in public surveys suggests that e-voting, 
which is one of the most visible activities of this institution, is also trusted. According to the 
latest (2017) Electoral Integrity Project public perception surveys13Fxiv, the ECI enjoys the 
highest confidence rate among state organisations. Indian citizens rated the ECI 8.08 out of 
10, comparatively they rated the political parties 4.58 and the police 5.5; in the US the EMBs 
are rated 7.23 out of 10, and the political parties 5.93, and the police 5.7. Indian citizens 
become clearly aware of the ECI when they vote and it is reasonable to infer that the trust in 
this institution is to a large extent a manifestation of attitudes to the voting procedures that 
involve the use of EVMs. In analyses of Indian political institutions, the introduction of EVMs 
is highlighted along other ECI interventions such as the deployment of central paramilitary 
forces, tougher legislation, and targeted security intensification in problematic areas that 
curbed first order malpractices such as booth capturing (Banerjee 2007; Vaishav 2017; 
Verma 2005). 
Trust in the integrity of voting procedures is often discernible in the media. For example, 
when political parties challenge the hackability of EVMs, the media tend to defend the 
trustworthiness of the voting procedures and technology, explaining the challenges as futile 
complaints of ‘bad losers’. Commenting on the two political parties’ claims at the 2017 
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assembly elections in Utter Pradesh and Uttarakhand that EVMs were tampered with, the 
Indian Express wrote: 
This is nothing but petulance and a lack of grace in defeat’ India’s democracy is far from 
flawless, but voters trust the polling process as free and fair. Over the years, the EC has 
deservedly emerged as one of the country’s most trusted institutions, a fair and independent 
monitor of the poll process. Courts, too, backed the EC’s efforts to weed out the flaws and 
distortions. Political parties across the spectrum recognise the sanctity of the polling process 
and instances of the looser blaming it on the EVM, the EC, or polling officials are rare. There 
have been times when candidates have been defeated by a narrow margin […] and they have 
challenged the verdict in court, but such cases have been few and far between. [The Indian 
Express, 13 March 2017] 
Most of our interviewees took the trustworthiness of e-voting for granted. Many of them 
barely engaged to answer our question whether e-voting is trusted. Instead, they 
spontaneously offered explanations of why it is trusted, telling us, for example, that with e-
voting, the ECI managed to overcome booth capturing and ballot stuffing and to speed up 
the announcement of results. 
These indications suggest the hypothesis that e-voting is widely trusted by voters in India. 
More specifically, we hypothesise that a) public acceptance of election results manifests 
trust in e-voting, and b) protests following election results have causes other than suspicion 
towards e-voting. 
 
ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF TRUST IN E-VOTING 
The difficulty of establishing the validity of the hypothesised trust in e-voting as an 
explanation for post-election public behaviour lies in disentangling trust attitudes to e-voting 
from alternative mechanisms that may be at play. Lack of protests after the announcement 
of election results in poor communities of developing countries may stem from indifference to 
democracy (Avgerou 2013a). Given widespread violence in Indian elections, another 
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possible explanation is intimidation. Also, protests after elections may express anger about 
election malpractices other than in the voting arrangements. In this section we first examine 
indifference to democracy - and elections more specifically - and intimidation as two 
alternative explanations for lack of protests on the announcement of election results. We 
then examine whether cases of protest and violence after elections express suspicion 
towards e-voting.  
Indifference 
The socio-economic conditions of voters are understood to affect their attitude to democracy, 
often creating apathy for elections (Aguilar et al. 2000; Blais 2006; Jensen et al. 2014). Poor 
and socially disadvantaged citizens may be less likely to vote; they may vote because of 
clientelistic relationships with political parties of powerful politicians or they may be 
vulnerable to vote buying. In such cases, lack of protest after elections may be an indication 
of indifference rather than trust in election institutions, and voting in particular.  
India is an interesting case in comparative politics because, despite low economic indicators 
and social divisions, voter turnout is comparable to that in rich countries with egalitarian 
established democracies. Although voting is not mandatory, turnout in general elections 
increased substantially in the first 20 years of the Indian democracy to reach an average of 
65.4% in 1967, and has remained above 60% since then (Banerjee 2014).  
A study of turnout in different Indian states (Diwakar 2008) showed that, paradoxically, 
turnout is higher among the poor than the rich, the less educated than the graduates, and 
rural than urban voters. Several explanations have been suggested for the participation of 
the Indian poor and socially disadvantaged in elections, including patronage, expression of 
grievances to the incumbents of government and a ritual expression of people’s valuing of 
democracy. In an ethnographic study in two villages in West Bengal in the 2001 assembly 
elections, Banerjee (2007) explains the high level of participation (more than 90% of the 
adult population) as taking the opportunity for confirming poor people’s citizenship in a 
democracy. She observed a celebratory atmosphere in which the ‘egalitarian mechanism of 
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the poll afforded particular pleasure [to the villagers]’ (2007). Similarly, a study of the 
motivations of the poor and the non-poor for voting in three Indian states by Ahuja and 
Chhibber (2012) found that the poor feel that voting is a right, dignifies them as citizens and 
allows them to hold the arbitrary state to account. In contrast, better-off citizens are 
characterised by being better connected to the state, and this makes them better positioned 
to gain from its services and employment opportunities, which leads them to see voting as a 
duty in relationships of patronage with politicians.  
Our observations of elections confirmed the celebratory character of the event, which is 
common across different caste and societal groups. People living in one of Trivandrum’s 
largest slums that we visited on the day of vote counting proudly showed us the ink mark on 
their finger which constitutes a proof of the vote. A community volunteer operating in slum 
colonies explained elections constitute a particularly important occasion for people of lower 
socioeconomic status: 
Who gets elected decides on important things such as social protection, food rations and other 
schemes, which are very important in the lives of the poor. Poor people queue for long hours on 
election day, to make sure they cast their vote. 
One of the reasons for below-poverty-line people to engage with elections is hence that 
ruling parties take key decisions for their lives, such as determining the entitlements that 
they receive under the nation’s anti-poverty agenda (Véron 2001). Also, as noted by the 
leader of a social service society in Trivandrum: 
[On election day] everyone, including poor people, can influence the politics of the state. This is 
the one day in which irrespective of their social condition, everyone has a say in how they are 
governed and by whom.  
According to this view, poor people find in the voting a moment in which, in spite of low 
bargaining power towards the state, they have a role in determining the outcome of national 
politics.  
In West Bengal, an academic expert of caste politics explained to us that people belonging 
to the lowest caste (Dalits), rather than being disengaged, are generally more engaged with 
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elections than the upper caste, due to the importance of political mobilisation for their 
collective rights. The caste factor thus adds to the state’s long history of class mobilisation, 
which developed with particular strength during the 34 years of the Left Front’s permanence 
in power. This has been particularly so in the state and panchayat elections of the last 
decade, in which an organisation of backward caste (Matua Mahasangha) has significantly 
influenced the electoral results.  
In short, we cannot explain lack of protestation to Indian election outcomes as citizens’ 
indifference. Indian citizens, particularly the very large number of poor and socially 
unprivileged, take a keen interest in elections, though for different reasons. 
Intimidation 
In regions with occurrence of violence, such as North Kerala and West Bengal, intimidation 
of voters by party loyalists, which prevents a free and fair election process from happening, 
is frequently reported. One form of intimidation happens when election results reveal voting 
distributions of polling stations, making it possible for candidates to retaliate based on how 
people voted. Interviewees noted that villages are often “punished” for voting in the “wrong” 
way, through denial of public assets such as roads or allocation of jobs in public work 
programmes.  
But the Indian political context encourages alertness of multiple vocal election stakeholders. 
This is particularly so in our fieldwork states, both of which are characterised by high levels 
of political participation and propensity of ordinary citizens to engage in public protest. In 
West Bengal class mobilisation has been present since independence, often taking the 
shape of violent protest led under the aegis of the Left Front (Mallick 2007). In Kerala, a 
history of civic engagement has resulted in today’s high frequency of public demonstrations: 
as powerfully summarised by a political party worker, “if Keralan citizens are at issue with the 
Government, they will take the streets just immediately”. 
Therefore, our study suggests that, in regions where there is no electoral violence, voters 
are not afraid to voice concerns about electoral malpractice. In regions where there is 
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electoral malpractice and turbulence prior to and during the election day, intimidation is 
unlikely to suppress public expression – voters do not remain silent after the election results.  
  
Do protests and violence after the announcement of election results indicate lack of trust in 
e-voting? 
We examined the violent protests that took place in West Bengal and North Kerala after the 
announcement of election results to detect whether they were an expression of suspicion to 
e-voting. We found no such evidence in the rhetoric of the protesters and the media 
commentators. The post-election turbulence was a continuation of election mobilisation 
clashes between political party supporters and between party supporters and law and order 
authorities. Such violence should be understood in relation to the rough political culture of 
India, where election candidates are often local power brokers affecting people’s 
fundamental life conditions amidst ineffective state institutions (Corbridge et al. 2005).  
As remarked by an election observer who served in states as diverse as Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, it is common for politicians to exercise patronage 
relationships with voters. In regions where politics are defined by caste interests, election 
contestants, often with criminal records (Vaishnav 2017), command a mix of fear and 
respect as protectors and avengers for disadvantaged social groups. The stakes are high for 
winners and losers and their supporters. During election campaigns candidates dispense 
cash and promises for jobs and social welfare. Losing candidates and their election staff, 
having spent fortunes in election campaigns, continue clashing with their opponents and 
sometimes resort to murder (Vaishnav 2017). 
Protests against e-voting exist, but they take the form of petitions by political party 
representatives and civil society activists (Herstatt et al. 2017) that become disputes 
between the ECI and petitioners – not demonstrations of public discontent. We found no 
evidence that such disputes affect public opinion about the trustworthiness of e-voting. None 
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of the voters we interviewed was even aware of them. One politician we talked with thought 
it conceivable that one of the powerful political party alliances might attempt to manipulate 
the e-voting technology, but this possibility was the least of her concerns – instead she was 
keen to describe the common malpractices of voter manipulation.  
We therefore posit that, when post-election demonstrations or violence occur, they are a 
continuation of electoral first order malpractice and political clashes among contester 
supporters, or between party supporters and public authorities; there is no evidence that 
they express suspicion to voting maladministration or rigging. 
 
STAGE 2: EXPLAINING TRUST IN E-VOTING 
HYPOTHESIZING MECHANISMS EXPLAINING TRUST IN E-VOTING 
Assuming that the observation of post-election public responses is evidence of the existence 
of trust in e-voting, in this section, we hypothesise mechanisms that explain how such trust is 
produced. Following the principle of retrodiction of critical realism, we draw mechanisms of 
trust creation in e-voting by analogy to the Brazilian and the Dutch cases and examine the 
extent to which and the manner they are active in the Indian electoral cycle and politics. 
Drawing mechanisms from the Brazilian and Dutch experiences for the explanation of trust in 
the Indian e-voting requires awareness of similarities and differences of the socio-technical 
e-voting system, that is, the technology in its organisational and broader context of elections.   
The e-voting of Brazil, used successfully in all elections in the whole country since 2000,  
comprises EVMs which were designed and manufactured in the country by local industry in 
partnership with the Brazilian EMB (Frank et al. 2017). The Brazilian EVMs are similar to the 
EVMs used in India in terms of method of capturing and aggregating votes. But its digital 
component is in software form and is reprogrammed for the candidates and the specific 
conditions of each election. This requires different processes for systems maintenance, 
deployment and security. The Brazilian EMB is also different, composed of Supreme Court 
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judges. The arrangements of polling stations and the principles of anonymity, security and 
efficiency are very similar.  
In the Netherlands, e-voting was introduced in the late 1980s using direct recording 
machines built by two private suppliers (Loeber 2008). By 2006, 90% of all votes in the 
nation were cast on the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B machine, whose hardware was built by 
Nedap and software was written by Groenendaal (Oostveen 2010). Questions on the 
security and verifiability of e-voting remained sporadic till 2006. In that year, concerned 
security scientists started a campaign called Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet (We do not 
trust voting computers). They demonstrated that brief access to the machine by an external 
hacker could alter recorded votes, and radio emanations from one of the machines could be 
received at several meters distance and tell what is being voted, hence endangering the 
secrecy of the vote too. The study therefore concluded that EVMs were unsuitable for 
elections. The mistrust of security scientists towards  e-voting quickly spread to the citizens, 
resulting in ‘a complete shift in the way people thought about the election system in the 
Netherlands’ (Oostveen 2010). As a result, the government set up two committees to 
examine security of the computerised electoral process. In September 2007, the Election 
Process Advisory Commission issued a report titled 'Voting with confidence', which 
highlighted critical flaws in the security of voting computers. In May 2008, the government 
decided that from then on elections would only be conducted using pencil and paper ballots, 
and a proposal of reintroducing voting computers was rejected. 
We draw an initial set of mechanisms from Avgerou’s (2013a) study of trust in e-voting in 
Beazil. Avgerou (2013) distinguished between initial formation of trust when it was first 
introduced in Brazil, and the sustenance of such trust in subsequent elections. Though 
different in their specific constituent processes, initial trust formation and subsequent 
sustenance were explained by three common mechanisms: associating e-voting with the 
strengthening of democracy; the intertwining of the success of e-voting with the 
reputation of the EMB; and the promotion in the country of a positive public attitude 
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towards IT. We take these as ‘portable’ theoretical propositions (Falleti et al. 2009) that 
provide an initial set of hypotheses to be validated, refuted, extended or refined in the Indian 
e-voting case study. In addition to this, we hypothesise by retroduction a fourth mechanism 
related to trust creation in the context of turbulent Indian elections. Our empirical research 
suggests that a disposition of trust in e-voting is formed amidst first order electoral 
malpractice. 
 
ASSESSMENT OF HYPOTHESIZED MECHANISMS OF TRUST IN E-VOTING 
Associating e-voting with the strengthening of democracy 
The logic underpinning this mechanism is that citizens come to trust e-voting if they see it 
contributing to the conduct of fair democratic elections. In Brazil, e-voting was conceived and 
developed during the democratisation mobilisation of the country in the 1980s, following 
nearly 20 years of military rule. The process of democratisation provided the rationale for the 
use of technology in voting as means for increasing citizen participation in elections. E-voting 
came to be associated with the enfranchisement of illiterate citizens who found it difficult to 
vote by writing the candidates’ names, as it was required by the prior paper ballot. Since its 
initial public acceptance, trust is maintained in the recurrent elections practice by the 
ongoing embedding of the upgrading and deployment of e-voting technology in key 
processes and institutions of democracy, including getting approval by parliament, 
involvement of political parties in the testing of system enhancements, and media attention. 
No such mechanism is reported in the Dutch e-voting case. Oostveen (2010) concludes her 
analysis of the withdrawal of EVMs by noting that the introduction of e-voting in the country 
‘seemed to be driven by technological possibilities and bureaucratic convenience, rather 
than by democratically debated social utility’ (p. 217). 
In India, e-voting is widely perceived as a contributor to fair representation of people’s 
choices. India was formed as an independent nation in 1947 and has since then established 
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a ‘sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic’ (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000). But its 
history of elections has been fraught with violence since the 1970s (Quraishi 2014). The 
biggest problem faced in many states is the recurrence of episodes of booth capturing – a 
practice of ‘criminal groups, delegated by political parties, capturing a polling station and 
stuffing the ballot box with large numbers of votes for the favoured candidate’ (Herstatt et al. 
2017). ECI’s efforts against this started well before computerisation, with the institution (in 
1989) of election observers who would monitor each constituency in the run-up to the polling 
and on the election day. 
When the first machines were commissioned to the companies BEL and ECIL, the declared 
intention was to combat the capture of polling booths (Verma 2009). To make it materially 
very difficult to “stuff” the ballot box, the system accepts only one vote every thirty seconds. 
One of the engineers who participated in the design of the first EVMs remarked:   
The machine has been built specifically to prevent booth capturing. If one tries to cast many 
votes, they would have to spend the whole day doing so, and by that time the police will be 
warned and intervene. 
Many voters we interviewed drew comparisons between voting by the EVMs and paper 
ballots. A middle-aged voter told us: 
With paper ballots, armed people would storm into the polling stations and fill the ballot box with 
votes for their candidate. Because of that, citizens who wanted to vote freely as normal would 
be discouraged from going to the polling station. This is not possible now, because the machine 
has a time delay between votes (...) booth capturing simply cannot happen with EVMs. 
This association of e-voting with addressing the problem of polling booth capturing was 
important for initial trust creation. It seems however that perception of the risk of ballot box 
stuffing and the association of e-voting with the alleviation of this risk continued beyond initial 
acceptance of e-voting. An analysis of post-poll survey data by Debnath et al. (2016) finds 
evidence of voters’ perception that e-voting reduced ballot box stuffing, suggesting that after 
the introduction of EVMs voters were ‘less likely to report that they did not cast their vote due 
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to fear of violence or vote capture, or that they were prevented from voting’. Comparisons 
with paper ballot were brought up in our interviews even by younger voters who participated 
in elections only after 2004, and hence had not experienced voting with paper ballots. During 
our stay at a university campus in Kolkata, a student confidently asserted that “whatever 
problem there may be with the EVMs, they will always be more secure than the paper 
system”, justifying this with the machine’s ability to combat booth capturing. Interviewees 
also drew comparisons in relation to vote counting, as in the case of a polling officer who 
had served in Delhi at the time of paper ballots: 
[Before e-voting was introduced], we would spend the entire night counting the ballots. If 
something odd was found, the recount would have to start again from the beginning. With EVMs 
there is no such problem, because it is the machine that does the counting. 
Also, as in Brazil, India’s e-voting is associated with the enfranchisement of the illiterate and 
people with various disabilities. Although no literacy was required for the paper ballot, as 
voters had to stamp the paper next to their preferred party or candidate symbol, often 
stamps were misplaced and the votes rejected. The e-voting solved the problem of rejected 
votes – all votes are unambiguously recorded and counted. Debnath et al.’s analysis (2016) 
estimated a significant reduction in the residual vote rate, leading to a 2.7 percent increase 
in the number of valid votes (Debnath et al. 2016). It also found that the ability of vulnerable 
citizens (illiterates, females, ‘scheduled castes and tribes’)14Fxv to cast their vote improved 
significantly after the introduction of the EVMs. Such improvements, experienced by voters 
and regularly confirmed by other election stakeholders, such as election observers and the 
media, created a widespread belief that e-voting is part of the striving of ECI for the 
improvement of democracy. So, at least for those who do not doubt that the EVMs 
accurately record cast votes, e-voting is a democratic improvement of elections.  
E-voting may have other benefits too, such as reducing costs of running elections or 
generating income for the country from selling home-developed technology to other 
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countries, but we did not find evidence that these create trust. On the contrary, election 
stakeholders may suspect that economic motives may compromise electoral integrity.  
Intertwining of the success of e-voting with the reputation of the EMB: Active trust building by 
the ECI  
Studies of e-voting tend to emphasise the significance of the competence of the country’s 
EMB for managing the processes of deployment and use of the technology and, more 
specifically, for putting in place measures that address security risks (IDEA 2011; IFES 
2013; McCormack 2016). From a socio-technical perspective of e-voting, the dependence of 
successful technology use on the competence of the EMB is only one part of the relationship 
– the other part is the dependence of the status of the EMB as a credible political institution 
on the technologies it mobilises to conduct election tasks. The ability of each of these two 
entities - the EVM technology and the EMB organisation - to enable the other to fulfil its 
tasks determines the continuity of their existence. Public opinion about the technology or 
organisational arrangements of e-voting inexorably affects confidence in the EMB. From this 
perspective, as the study of e-voting in Brazil suggests, trust in e-voting is actively created 
by an EMB as part of caring for its own status and reputation as a core institution of 
democracy. Furthermore, the experience of the Netherlands suggests that detachment of the 
procedures of e-voting from the EMB’s responsibilities and activities breeds public suspicion, 
protest, and ultimately rejection of e-voting.  
In the Brazilian case, IT innovation in elections was associated with the efforts of the EMB – 
the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) - to establish itself as a competent political institution and 
a guarantor of democracy. A mutual reinforcement was found between the success of the 
technology component of e-voting and the success of the organisation responsible for and 
dependent on it to perform its mission. The TSE took the initiative in the 1990s to examine the 
feasibility of introducing computers for voting in order to stop voting fraud and to strengthen 
political participation and inclusion. Lacking itself adequate IT expertise, it invited technical 
experts from Federal ministries to define the system’s technical requirements and 
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specification. Subsequently, the system was developed in partnership with private IT 
companies. Even after the successful introduction of e-voting throughout the country, the TSE 
continues to cultivate a positive reputation as a competent government agency by ongoing 
publicly visible processes for the improvement of e-voting software and e-voting processes, 
widely publicised testing ‘ceremonies’ and public confrontation with doubters of the system 
trustworthiness to address their arguments of system vulnerabilities. 
No such link between the EMB in the design and management of e-voting was cultivated in 
the history of e-voting in the Netherlands. One of the main findings of the analysis of the 
causes of public suspicion that led to the withdrawal of the system was the loss of control 
over the elections by delegating not only the development of the technology but also the 
voting operations and the counting of votes to private companies (Loeber 2008; Oostveen 
2010). Lacking in house IT expertise, the Dutch EMB – the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom 
Relations – did not adequately participate in the determination of either the technical or legal 
requirements for the security features of the machines and the voting process through them. 
The technology was developed in the 1980s by private IT companies, certified by a private 
company and, since then, it was owned, maintained and enhanced by the technology 
manufacturers.  The EMB had no property rights over the machine and could not access its 
software code. The companies owning the machines were also responsible for their 
deployment and operations during elections, in effect having full control of the voting process 
and the production of election results. 
In India, the success of e-voting has become a core characteristic of the identity of ECI as 
carer of fair and free elections.  Elections in a country of subcontinental dimensions, a CEC 
argued, ‘cannot be done easily without the application of user-friendly technology’ (Quraishi 
2014). The ECI, lacking in house IT expertise, entrusted the overseeing of the design, 
security and technical integrity of the machines to an experts’ committee comprising staff 
from the Ministry of Defence, the state Indian Institute of Technology, academics and 
technology professional of the India IT industry.  
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 Yet, the EVMs have repeatedly been subject to controversy, mainly over whether the 
machines are tamperable by outsiders or insiders to the election process. Against such 
challenges, the ECI has actively undertaken to demonstrate the trustworthiness of e-voting 
and defend it when it is challenged, in two ways. First, it has developed elaborate 
procedures for checking security and correct functioning of the machines at various stages 
of their deployment for elections, with the presence of political party representatives. The 
procedures do not completely satisfy the voting technology experts, who note that several 
security measures, such as the multiple means of sealing, are not particularly robust 
(Herstatt et al. 2017). Nevertheless, these procedures publicly demonstrate to voters, 
journalists and observers the ECI’s vigilance against tampering. 
Second, the ECI has turned criticisms of security shortcomings to demonstrations of 
engagement and control of the voting process. . As a senior electoral officer pointed out, 
such engagement was conducted at the state level too: 
[When serving as CEO of Karnataka] I had a billboard in my office, inviting whoever found any 
problems with the EVMs to come and talk to me about it. The announcement was in the 
newspapers too, it was published every time an election took place. But nobody, for my whole 
time in office, ever raised an issue with the functioning of the machines.  
By repeatedly engaging with the Supreme Court of India and High Courts of various states, 
teams of IT experts, civil society, and the media to address disputes over the security of the 
EVMs, the ECI confirms its identity as the guardian of electoral integrity either by enhancing 
electoral technology or by rebutting accusations of election rigging by EVM tampering. A 
decisive enactment of the former is the decision to introduce Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail 
(VVPAT) taken in 2010 after pressure from voting technology experts and political parties. 
VVPAT has been developed in response to concerns for lack of a tangible proof of the vote. 
It adds to the EVM a printer producing a physical record of the vote, visible to voters and 
usable for re-counting in the event of a dispute. Another enhancement of the EVMs that is 
being discussed by the ECI, which reaffirms its willingness to continue developing the 
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technology in response to perceived problems, called a totaliser, aggregates results across 
polling stations, without disclosing them boothwise to prevent risk of retaliation based on 
voting behaviour.15Fxvi 
An example of the latter is the invitation to challengers of the non-tamperability of the EVMs  
to demonstrate how the EVMs might be tampered. In 2009, the ECI invited the challengers 
to a public demonstration of their claims, organising access to 100 randomly chosen 
machines. The challengers did not demonstrate malfunctioning or tamperability, but they 
remained unsatisfied with the opportunity they were given because they were not allowed to 
inspect the design of the machine. Opening up the EVM, according to the ECI and the 
manufacturers, would allow for reverse engineering and violate property rights (Herstatt et al. 
2017). A hackathon was also organised in June 2017 after a petition challenging the integrity 
of EVMs in the Utter Pradesh state legislative elections. As in earlier such incidents, this 
hackathon too failed to prove tamperability of the machines but left the challengers 
unsatisfied because of restricted access to hardware (Herstatt et al. 2017). Secrecy of the 
design and the source code is deemed by the ECI and the manufacturers of the EVMs 
necessary for the security of e-voting. The media however drew attention to the as yet 
another ‘victory’ for the EVMs, giving the Election Commissioner the opportunity to reinforce 
the claim that the system cannot be hacked.16Fxvii 
Promotion in the country of a positive public attitude towards IT 
A third mechanism contributing to the creation of trust in e-voting is citizens’ attitude towards 
IT. Social groups, and indeed whole countries, differ about the significance of potential 
benefits or risks attributed to IT innovation, an attitude that is generally known as ‘IT culture’ 
(Leidner et al. 2006). In some countries the prevailing attitude is welcoming of the diffusion 
of IT as an improvement of individual and public life while in others there is widespread 
concern about various negative effects of IT. In many developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s computerisation was associated with the erosion of industrialisation and cheap labour 
advantage and was discouraged by government policies that taxed the import of computers 
43 
 
as luxuries. In advanced industrialised countries, where IT innovation has for more than 
three decades been considered necessary for competition and growth in a global open 
economy, there are widespread concerns about concomitant risks of security and loss of 
privacy. 
In Brazil, citizens across social groups came to associate IT with improvement of economic 
outlook and quality of services. Several government policies contributed to a perception of IT 
innovation as a positive force, the most prominent of which were policies promoting an 
indigenous IT industry as an engine of economic growth in the 1980s (Evans 1986; Evans et 
al. 1992). The ongoing cultivation of a positive attitude towards IT continued with 
government policies to bridge the digital divide and the promotion of e-government which 
spread the belief that IT is necessary for effective public services. Innovative uses of IT in 
business sectors such as banks associated it with service quality improvement and created 
expectations for the diffusion of IT in government services too. In short, IT came to be seen 
as a right to strive for rather than a change that should be resisted. 
In the Netherlands people are used to continuous IT innovation. Pioneering projects brought 
IT into the public spaces of the country. The importance of IT infrastructures for public 
services has been actively promoted by Dutch e-government initiatives and through multiple 
European Union projects. Dutch citizens have willingly participated in pioneering initiatives 
for the use of IT in public domains. Indicative of such public sensitising to the potential of IT 
is the ‘Amsterdam Digital City’ initiative that started in 1993. Van den Bessalaar and Beckers 
(2005) traced the various meanings attributed to the ‘digital city’ as a node of the global 
economy, a space of improved public services and a community network empowering 
people in their local context. They also analysed its ultimate decline as a non-profit model 
and abandonment. With exposure to such bold IT innovation, Dutch citizens have been 
sensitized to some of the most intractable dilemmas of the digital era, including issues 
concerning business models of digital services, privacy and security. In his analysis of the 
withdrawal of the Dutch e-voting system, Loeber (2008) notes a trend of declining trust in IT 
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solutions in the public domain, using as an example the debates opposing a government 
initiative to introduce a scheme of electronic payments in the public transportation system. 
The Dutch citizens are not technophobes, but they are highly alert to potential risks from IT 
infrastructures. 
In India, as in Brazil, two complementary dynamics have concurred to the formation of a 
positive attitude towards IT. The first pertains to policies developed with the aim of launching 
the country’s IT industry, programmatically inscribed in the nation’s development plans since 
the early 1970s (Evans 1992). The second, started in the late 1990s, pertains to 
computerisation of many aspects of government and particularly of public service provision. 
E-government has become an integral part of subsequent governments’ efforts to provide 
more accountable services, tackling the numerous problems of the nation’s complex 
bureaucracy. Significantly, issues of government service provision have historically hit the 
poor and marginalised (Conge 1988). Large numbers of Indians come to experience IT as 
tools for anti-poverty programmes, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS), which 
constitutes the largest food security scheme in the nation, and the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). 
In India, national policies affect states differently and we need to consider also state level 
policies. While different in their contextual specificities, both states we studied have had 
historical paths in which the IT industry has moved from a marginal role to one of core socio-
economic significance. In Kerala, a development model that strongly prioritised redistributive 
policies to economic growth was abandoned in the 1990s giving rise to policies that promote 
industrial growth and openness towards private sector. Resulting from these changes, the 
‘new’ Kerala development model (Véron 2001) reconciled social and productive goals, 
opening up to the IT industry at the same point in time when elections were becoming 
computerised in the whole nation. Developments in the IT industry have been leveraged by 
the Kerala government to generate employment opportunities for vulnerable groups. For 
example, in pursuit of its poverty eradication policy, in 1998 the Kerala state government 
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created Kudumbashree, a community organisation of women’s self-help groups working as 
local ‘social enterprises’. Many of these belong to the IT sector, and outsource IT-related 
jobs to below-poverty-line women members (Heeks et al. 2010). Developed in concomitance 
with the greater openness of the state to industry, the Kudumbashree model of outsourcing 
became central to the anti-poverty action of the state, presenting the government’s stance 
on IT as generator of durable employment for people belonging to lower socio-economic 
strata. Similarly to Kerala, in West Bengal, setbacks suffered as a result of low 
industrialisation and hostility to the private sector in the 1980s and 1990s triggered changes 
in the government’s attitude towards the IT industry. Opening up to large Indian and 
international software companies, successive governments prioritised the IT industry as a 
main engine for the state’s development.  
Also, in both states, governments have leveraged IT to put forward the principles 
characterising their development models, creating citizen-centric services, with special 
attention to the weaker strata of their population. For example, the Kerala State Information 
Technology Mission (KSITM) has been promoting IT use throughout the state. ‘Single 
Window’ schemes for IT-enabled tax collection and bill payments benefited middle class 
citizens, facilitating their transactions with a highly dysfunctional state bureaucracy. 
Telecentres brought IT literacy and computerised government services to poorer people in 
remote areas. Indicatively, in the early 2000s, the Akshaya telecentre project, piloted in the 
Malappuram district, a relatively backward area of north Kerala, provided computer training 
to one member of every household, thus creating basic IT literacy (Madon 2005). Reaching 
out to the most remote areas of the state, Akshaya exemplified the leveraging of IT for the 
objectives of inclusion and social protection characterising the Kerala development model. 
Similarly, the government of West Bengal launched the ‘information technology policy of 
government’ in 2000, which triggered its engagement with the computerisation of citizen 
services. In 2006 it launched E-District, a project aimed at making the State's services 
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available to citizens through CSCs (Common Service Centers) or the internet. Like Akshaya, 
E-District is based on e-kiosks that replace the state’s complex paper-based procedures. 
Older e-government initiatives, based on computerisation of government offices and citizen 
services, have more recently been combined with the state-level uptake of the Digital India 
campaign. Launched in 2015, the campaign is set to ‘transform India into a digitally-
empowered society’, using digital technologies to extend the benefits of ICTs to the poor and 
vulnerable. Central to Digital India is the combination of the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan 
Yojana (a central-level flagship programme for financial inclusion), Aadhaar (a biometric 
database for unique identification of all enrolees), and mobile technologies, increasingly 
used in the delivery of services. Known as ‘JAM Trinity’ from its acronym (Jan Dhan Yojana 
– Aadhaar – Mobiles), this combination sets to produce a radical transformation of service 
delivery, especially seeking to transform the country’s anti-poverty system, based on the 
provision of in-kind subsidies, into a system based on direct cash transfers (Government of 
India 2015). 
The effectiveness of Digital India campaigns for anti-poverty programmes such as PDS and 
NREGS is debated at the national and state level (Drèze et al. 2017; Masiero 2015). For the 
purposes of our analysis, however, it is important to note the association of IT in the states of 
Kerala and West Bengal with a sequence of policies mirroring their historical focus on strong 
social protection systems that seek to minimise exclusion, and therefore cultivating a view of 
it as an instrument of development - a climate in which e-voting is framed as a ‘natural’ 
interface for the conduct of elections.  
An additional mechanism: Trust disposition to e-voting formed amidst first order electoral 
malpractice 
Trust in e-voting in areas where electoral politics are turbulent, such as in West Bengal and 
North Kerala, requires particular attention. We argued above that protests and violence 
witnessed in these areas do not express discontent with e-voting; they are generated by 
malpractice of contesting candidates and their election campaigns. At this point we suggest 
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that in such cases, e-voting enjoys trust as an orderly, free of violence voter experience in 
contrast to prior stages of the electoral cycle. 
Voters’ attitude to e-voting is formed as part of the overall experience of the electoral cycle 
and the broader institution of democracy, such as the Houses of Parliament and the state 
legislative assemblies. First and second order electoral malpractices are tangible and 
frequent in Indian elections. The most visible first order malpractice is the ‘buying’ of votes 
by political parties. Several of our interviewees in Trivandrum told us that they received 
money from election candidates. The problem is well known to India and those who study 
the state of the Indian democracy. 
Currency notes come into the election bazaar first in container and cargo quantities, then in truck loads, 
going into wholesale, small retail and finally in attachés, thailas, jholas and jeb-sized portions, every five 
years at the least and often oftener than that. They originate either legally, through licit company 
donations or come from a myriad sources which [… ] necessarily and unavoidably go back to our natural 
resources such as mines, forests and land. Illegal transactions in all these yield harvests of black cash. 
(Gopalkrishna Gandhi, Indian Administrative Service officer, ex-Goverrnor of West Bengal;2014)  
Even in areas where there is no first order electoral malpractice, e-voting may stand out in 
comparison to voters’ experiences in prior election-related activities. Many voters in India 
experience second order malpractice in gross irregularities of electoral rolls with 
consequences for their authentication at the polling stations. Unlike voting, computerisation 
of electoral rolls is uneven across the nation. The rolls are often found to be incomplete and 
inaccurate, resulting in denial of the right to vote for those affected. As highlighted by a civic 
activist interviewed in Bangalore, 
Voter registers are ridden with errors and mismatches, resulting every year in thousands of 
eligible voters being unable to cast their vote – either because they are registered in the wrong 
constituency, or because their name is simply missing from the rolls [...] only Kerala has 
computerised voter registration, so that voters can check their enrolment online. In other states, 
it is all too frequent for voters to turn up on election day to find out their name is not in the list. 
48 
 
Inaccurate electoral rolls also entail opportunities for impersonation. Voters in both states of 
our research talked to us about the risk that someone may vote in their place in case of 
absence on election day. The problem was brought up by students at local universities, who 
could not arrange to return to the state of origin in the occasion of the latest general 
elections.  
Relative to such problematic aspects of the election experience, e-voting is experienced as 
one of the least problematic and dangerous. When reaching the polling booth, is less likely 
to face problems than when registering or being authenticated and allowed to vote. Thus, we 
suggest that an additional mechanism for the development of trust in e-voting is the 
accumulated voter experience of election up to the point of voting. Voters develop a positive 
attitude of trust towards e-voting by comparison of their experience of voting with other 
negative experiences during elections. 
THEORETICAL STOCK TAKING 
India’s e-voting is a remarkable achievement, formed in the historical context of the country’s 
political and socio-economic development. Yet, our analysis shows that the development of 
trust in e-voting in that country involves causal mechanisms which are also detected in the 
development of public attitudes towards e-voting in other countries, Brazil and the 
Netherlands.  In this section we put together a causal assessment of trust/suspicion in e-
voting and an explanation of the formation of trust/suspicion in e-voting in concepts that are 
relevant across national contexts. The proposed explanation is in the form of a set of 
interrelated causal processes that might produce trust in e-voting. 
Our theorising adopts a concept of e-voting as a socio-technical system embedded in a 
country’s electoral cycle and the national political and socio-economic context of a country 
and a concept of trust as an enacted cognitive state of voters, which results from the 
ongoing actions of multiple actors, including the voters themselves (Weick 1988). Trust in e-
voting, therefore, is not a direct effect of the artefacts of voting, or inherent in individuals’ 
psychology. Nor can it be explained as individuals’ perceptions of direct impact of their 
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interaction with IT on their interests (Markus 1983). Perceptions of risk and trustworthiness 
of e-voting are produced and reproduced in the practice of voting in relation to the broader 
voter experience of elections, such as election campaigns and elections administration, as 
well as the consequences of elections, such as peaceful transition to a new government or 
violent protests, etc. 
A fundamental question in research on trust in e-voting is how trust can be detected, given 
that it is not an observable entity. From the perspective of trust as an enacted cognitive 
state, trust is manifested in voters’ actions. The general model of the electoral process 
(Figure 1) suggests that voters’ trust or suspicion may be manifested in various ways. They 
may choose to participate or not participate in voting and perhaps protest prior to the 
election day about the untrustworthiness of voting arrangements. They may accept election 
results or challenge them and protest after the election day. In our research of the Indian 
elections we sought to identify trust in e-voting by analysing voter responses to election 
results because voting participation in the states we studied is high despite widespread 
election malpractice.  
Overall, from the analysis of alternative explanations of observed post-election responses, 
we concluded that e-voting is widely trusted in the Indian states we studied. This conclusion 
cannot be generalised. Indifference to elections and intimidation are possible mechanisms 
affecting voters’ responses to election outcomes in other country contexts. Also, as in India, 
protests observed in other countries are likely to be unrelated to voting arrangements. But 
the relative weight of these mechanisms need to be analysed in relation to a country’s 
circumstances.  
Having ascertained the existence of widespread trust in e-voting, we then traced 
mechanisms producing such trust, building first on existing theoretical propositions and 
empirical evidence from studies in other countries where e-voting systems similar to India’s 
have been used. Our study of India’s e-voting finds evidence for the validity of the 
mechanisms identified in the Brazilian e-voting, albeit in different manifestations. Brazilian 
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citizens initially identified the democracy enhancing value of e-voting in its enfranchising 
impact for illiterate voters. In India, democracy-enhancing effects were associated with the 
curbing of booth capturing and ballot box stuffing. After the initial trust formation, the caring 
for the integrity of voting by their highly trusted EMBs has in both cases been pursued by a 
combination of publicly visible elaborate procedures of e-voting technology deployment, 
technology enhancements, and rebuttals of challengers of EVMs. Unlike the Indian EVMs, 
the software of the Brazilian system is continuously enhanced in between elections, but so 
far, the TSE has resisted pressures to introduce VVPAT. Both countries have similar 
histories of industrial policies for harnessing IT innovation for socio-economic development. 
They have also pursued policies for addressing the digital divide which created an 
understanding of IT as a technology of progress, to be embraced rather than avoided.  
Electoral malpractice, in comparison to which Indian voters come to value their trouble-free 
experience of voting, is more prevalent in India, but it is not absent in Brazil. Elections in that 
country have been increasingly overshadowed by allegations of corruption. It seems that the 
perception of trustworthiness of e-voting overseen by an EMB that is independent from the 
government and party politics is enhanced by a comparison to party political campaigns 
widely considered to be marred by corruption. 
E-voting in the Netherlands is a contrasting case which strengthens the validity of the 
proposed mechanisms as trust producing processes. It indicates that the lack of these 
mechanisms may breed suspicion. In the Netherlands, e-voting was introduced in a 
democracy confident about the integrity of its existing means of voting; voters could neither 
see any democracy enhancing effects from e-voting, nor see it as more trustworthy in 
comparison to more troubled aspects of the election cycle. Suspicion towards the 
trustworthiness of e-voting was fuelled by entrusting its administration to an IT service 
provider. While citizens of European countries are familiar and generally comfortable with IT 
innovation as a force of socio-economic betterment, they are concerned about privacy and 
security, particularly in the use of technology by state institutions. 
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Two of the four mechanisms are socio-technical processes occurring in the unfolding of the 
electoral cycle. These are the perception of trustworthiness of voting with the EVMs 
comparatively to the experience of socio-material practices in other stages of the electoral 
cycle, and through the active trust cultivation by EMBs reputation as effective innovator to 
improve the quality of elections. The other two mechanisms concern voter experiences that 
occur in the broader politico-economic development of the country, namely the impact of the 
new technology mediated means of voting for the country’s representativeness of 
democracy and the way IT is understood to impact life conditions. 
Taken together, the four mechanisms we identified provide a plausible explanation for trust 
in e-voting observed in India and Brazil. Their absence or relative weak existence explain 
also the suspicion to e-voting in the Netherlands that led to its withdrawal. Each of them is 
adequately abstract to be recognised in the election context of most modern nation states. 
Therefore, they may explain manifestations of trust in e-voting in other countries too. It 
needs to be stressed, however, that mechanism-based explanations are inherently 
incomplete and indeterminate (Avgerou 2013b). Social phenomena are too complex to be 
explained by a set of generic causal processes. The presence of the same mechanisms 
does not guarantee the same effects across countries, or even across states in federal 
countries, such as India and Brazil. Moreover, as our effort to ascertain the existence of trust 
in e-voting from public responses to election outcomes demonstrates, mechanisms and their 
effects may differ in terms of strength. As a mechanism explaining acceptance of election 
results, voters’ trusting of e-voting may coexist with voter intimidation and, in such cases, 
their combined effects depend on their relative strength. Also, each of the four mechanisms 
contributing to the creation of trust may vary in terms of strength. The effect of the 
combination of the four mechanisms is not a binary trust or suspicion, but a position on a 
continuum between absolute trust and deep suspicion, better expressed as a trusting or 
suspicious disposition.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Our research combines prior knowledge on processes and conditions generating or 
inhibiting trust in e-voting with a case study of e-voting in two Indian states to construct a 
socio-technical causal explanation of citizen responses to the use of e-voting. Our 
contribution is threefold. First, we problematize the detection of trust in e-voting and explore 
its existence in the post-election actions of voters. Second, we extend existing theory on 
causal mechanisms explaining trust in e-voting, elaborating on the form they may take and 
adding a new mechanism. Third, methodologically, we combined principles of retroduction 
and retrodiction to build theory comparatively and incrementally by adding insights from an 
in-depth country case study to research findings in other countries. We thus pursued a 
cross-country comparative approach to incrementally refine/enrich theoretical propositions 
that are expressed in concepts that are generally relevant but sensitive to country-context 
specific historical circumstances.  
Our research findings offer insights that can inform decisions and actions for the introduction 
of e-voting in countries across the world. As the EMBs of several countries in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America are contemplating the introduction of e-voting, questions arise about the 
suitability of e-voting for new democracies with yet unsettled electoral politics. International 
thinktanks on elections offer practical advice (IDEA 2011; IDEA 2015; IFES 2013) most of 
which is supported by our research. Particularly important is the significance attributed to the 
competence of the EMB and its ability to manage the deployment of the e-voting technology 
and to work out effective voting procedures. In addition to this, our study suggests the 
importance of convincing citizens that e-voting is introduced to strengthen the integrity of 
elections for democratic outcomes. Other objectives, such as cost efficiency or technology 
innovation for the modernization of state institutions, while important for public management, 
are unlikely to boost voter trust in election results. On the contrary, they may raise suspicion 
of ulterior motives of the policy makers that may compromise the imperative of fair elections.  
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Our research suggests that a distinction needs to be made between technology expert views 
on the trustworthiness of the e-voting technology and public trust in e-voting. Technology 
scrutiny from computer and political scientists is crucially important, highlighting technology 
vulnerabilities and institutional shortcomings and providing technical solutions to ameliorate 
security risks inherent in technology design. VVPAT is a clear example of a technical 
enhancement that has the potential to improve confidence in casting votes in the ‘black box’ 
of an EVM. But our research shows that voters’ trust is cultivated or damaged by their 
experience with the whole process of EVMs-mediated elections rather than the EVM 
artefacts alone. Well-designed artefacts may not enjoy voter trust if the processes of 
technology maintenance, deployment and use management are perceived to be obscure 
and vulnerable to insider or external fraud. And, on the contrary, security weaknesses 
pointed out by technology experts may not lessen voter trust if they are confident about the 
integrity and competence of the EMB. Both Brazil and India provide examples about this 
mismatch between technology weakness arguments and voters’ trust. The demonstration of 
EVMs’ security vulnerability in India has given ground to losing political parties to challenge 
election results, but did not mobilise public protests. In Brazil, the TSE has resisted pressure 
from computer security experts to introduced VVPAT, without evidence so far of 
compromising voters’ trust. In both countries the EMBs compensate for security risks by 
publicising and following elaborate procedures of EVM deployment management. 
Nevertheless, the change of public attitude about the significance of EVM security risks in 
the Netherlands suggests that voters’ trust cannot be taken for granted. Even without major 
incidents of machine or process security breaches and fraudulent tampering, public attention 
can be sensitised by the arguments of technology experts, particularly if they are supported 
by pro-democracy activists.  
Another question about the diffusion of e-voting across countries concerns the importance of 
technology ownership and control. In both India and Brazil, the EVMs were designed and 
manufactured by their local IT industry. In Brazil the TSE was closely involved in the design 
54 
 
of both hardware and software and continues to oversee technology enhancements in 
between elections. In India the ECI relies on an advisory committee of technology experts, 
mostly from government agencies, and the EVMs are manufactured by state corporations. 
Although in both cases EVMs have technology components produced by foreign 
corporations, and therefore requiring a degree of trust in actors outside the national state 
agencies, EMB and public confidence about indigenous ability to retain control of technology 
remains high (Herstatt et al. 2017). Most developing countries, however, acquire e-voting 
technologies from the international market, often as turn-key systems. India and Brazil for 
example are selling their systems, as well as advice on the conduct of e-voting, to other 
countries. Research is needed to understand such cases. The contrasting case of e-voting 
reversal in the Netherlands amply demonstrates the heightened perception of risk when not 
only voting technology is purchased from the market but the conduct of voting through it is 
outsourced (Oostveen 2010). One could speculate that new democracies lacking technology 
and public management capabilities may benefit from partnerships with private IT services 
providers. But our case studies show the importance of citizen confidence that the EMBs 
have capabilities to supervise private service providers and retain control of technology-
mediated elections. These need to be tested in further comparative research. 
Finally, a question that requires attention is the suitability of e-voting in countries with 
turbulent political cultures and gross first order elections malpractice. Our study of e-voting in 
India suggests that trusted e-voting may indeed be possible and have positive effects on 
voters’ perception of the trustworthiness of election results. This surprising finding needs to 
be qualified. It was made possible in India by two of the generative mechanisms identified in 
our research: the perception of e-voting as a solution to a specific malpractice, booth 
capturing; and the active trust cultivation by the ECI which is already highly trusted for its 
commitment to fighting electoral fraud. If such mechanisms are not present in countries 
where elections involve malpractice and violence, introducing e-voting is highly likely to 
worsen citizen suspicion as another area of fraudulent practice.  
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Our theoretical contribution, in the form of a set of mechanisms for the formation/loss of trust 
in e-voting, has potential for explaining also trust in other techno-organisational 
arrangements in the public sphere of contemporary democracies. The withdrawal of e-voting 
after many years of use in unproblematic elections to paper ballot is an extreme case of 
reversal of installed government digital infrastructure to manual systems. It nevertheless 
bears lessons for the use of IT in other key information infrastructures of democracies 
currently being introduced in various countries, as for example digital citizen identification 
systems (Hosein et al. 2010; McGrath 2016; Whitley et al. 2007). Such systems entail 
controversies among government administrators and technology experts about security and 
privacy risks similar to those about e-voting. Our research shows that to become part of the 
fabric of modern government and society such infrastructures need to gain and sustain 
public trust. While influenced by experts’ analyses, public trust is developed or destroyed by 
generative mechanisms associated with events, processes and conditions in the political and 
socio-economic context.  
Extending the theoretical explanation of trust in e-voting to other population-wide public 
digital infrastructures of government, we postulate that they are likely to enjoy citizen trust if: 
a) They are introduced as part of broader government efforts for developing state/citizen 
relationships suitable for modern democracies, producing visible social welfare benefits; 
neither efficiency gains nor arguments about technological progress are adequate trust 
engendering justifications of large scale state infrastructures. b) They are actively 
championed by and identified as core components of the tasks of authorities of unblemished 
reputation. c) They are introduced in a context where IT is positively perceived as a driver for 
socio-economic development, with policies that effectively address public concerns about 
risks associated with IT, such as unemployment or loss of privacy. d) In countries with 
turbulent political cultures they are not implicated in corruption and create spaces of orderly 
exercise of citizens’ rights. The validity of these mechanisms of trust creation need to be 
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tested and further developed with research on public acceptance of digital infrastructures in 
various countries, such as India’s Aadhaar.  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
 
Field trips, dates and locations 
Visit 
 
Locations 
 
1st  
 
Bangalore, 9-28 April 2015 
Trivandrum, 18-21 April 2015 
 
2nd  
 
Bangalore, 14 August-2 September 2015 
Trivandrum, 20-24 August 2015 
 
 
3rd  
 
New Delhi, 3-4 May 2016 
Nandigram, 5 May 2016 
Kolkata, 6-7 May 2016 
Bangalore, 8-11 May 2016 
Trivandrum, 12-20 May 2016 
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Interviews and subjects discussed  
 
Interviews Subjects Discussed 
 
Former Chairman and Managing 
Director (CMD) at Bharat Electronics 
Limited (company producing EVMs) 
(3) 
 
 
Technical features of EVMs, history of system development, 
evolution of EVMs through the years, potential security issues 
and solutions to them 
 
State-level politicians (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
Involvement of politicians in e-voting, public attitudes towards it, 
perceived risks of electoral fraud, ECI’s role in guaranteeing 
electoral integrity, perception of ECI by political parties 
 
Technology developers and 
security scientists (9) 
 
 
Roles of technology in the electoral cycle, trustworthiness of the 
e-voting system, computer security issues with EVMs, reported 
fragilities in the electoral rolls, potential and reported 
consequences on election processes 
 
Polling officers (6) 
 
 
Their duties on election day, their perception of the system’s 
security, the logistic organisation of elections 
 
Political activists campaigning for 
elections (5) 
 
 
 
Perception of electoral fraud by voters,  roles of activism in 
guaranteeing transparency of election processes, the ongoing 
State Assembly elections, history of elections in Kerala, 
expected  
outcomes of the ongoing election 
 
Members/former members of 
electoral management bodies (3) 
 
 
 
Legal and organisational processes of elections, changes of the 
electoral process associated with EVMs, issues of vote buying 
and other forms of malpractice, the ongoing election and the 
expected issues and outcomes 
 
 
Voters (18) 
 
 
 
Their experience of voting, their perception of elections and the 
election results, comparison with elections before e-voting, 
perceived diffusion of malpractice in Indian elections 
 
Academic researchers (political 
scientists, e-governance researchers) 
(8) 
 
 
The role of technology in the electoral cycle, the ongoing 
elections and public perception of them, trustworthiness of the 
e-voting system, diffusion of electoral violence, caste politics 
and their influence on elections 
 
Staff at NGOs working with 
marginalised groups (10) 
 
Perception of elections by the poor and vulnerable, voting 
processes experienced by slum dwellers and marginalised 
citizens, comparison with elections before e-voting, perception 
of malpractices in Indian elections 
Total Interviews: 71  
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Web Sites, Blogs and Surveys 
Elections in India: 
Election Commission of India: http://eci.nic.in  
State Election Commission of West Bengal: http://www.wbsec.gov.in  
State Election Commission of Kerala: http://sec.kerala.gov.in  
Electoral Integrity Project: https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/  
Lokniti – Programme for Comparative Democracy: http://www.lokniti.org/  
The Indian Election Blog: https://theindianelectionblog.wordpress.com/  
PG’s Pensieve (blog on fragilities in Indian electoral rolls):  https://pgbhat.wordpress.com  
Ideas for India: http://www.ideasforindia.in/  
Economic and Political Weekly: http://www.epw.in/  
Times of India: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/  
Indian Express: http://indianexpress.com/  
State of Democracy in South Asia: http://www.lokniti.org/democracy-south-asia.php  
ECI’s Manual on Vulnerability mapping: 
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/HandBooks/Manual_on_VulnerabilityMapping_27052016.pdf  
 
E-voting – international agencies: 
• International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) – Introducing Electronic 
Voting: Essential Considerations: http://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/introducing-
electronic-voting-essential-considerations  
• International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) – Implementing and Overseeing Electronic 
Voting and Counting Technologies: http://www.ifes.org/publications/implementing-and-
overseeing-electronic-voting-and-counting-technologies  
• Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project: https://vote.caltech.edu/  
• Atlantic Council – Democracy Rebooted: The Future of Technology in Elections 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/webcasts/democracy-rebooted-the-future-of-technology-in-
elections  
• Electoral Integrity Project -  https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/  
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i Our definition of e-voting does not include online casting of votes, usually referred to as internet 
voting or i-voting. Except for Estonia that allows internet voting as an option, few countries consider 
internet voting for national or provincial elections because of high fraud and voter coercion risks. 
ii http://vote.caltech.edu/  
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iii Without official or well documented media sources, we draw data on violence from many blogs, 
especially blogs that attack the CPI-M: https://thinkprogress.org/west-bengal-election-result-1b9ae4  
9781e.   
iv http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/prestige-battle-for-trinamool-as-civic-polls-
underway-in-bengal/ 
v http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/violence-paves-way-for-2016-bengal-elections/1/557722.html  
vi The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is a paramilitary volunteer organisation, ascribing to 
Hindu nationalism and closely linked to the BJP (Corbridge and Harriss 2000). 
vii https://scroll.in/article/810297/its-bloody-business-as-usual-in-kannur-but-will-the-kerala-cm-be-the-
one-to-end-it  
viii Kerala has also intensively promoted Aadhaar, India’s system for biometric identification of 
residents, as a means to deliver social benefits to the poor: http://www.acleddata.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/ACLED_Asia_TrendReport_September2016.pdf 
ix CPM is another Acronym for Communist Party of India-Marxist, most commonly referred to as 
CPI(M). 
x http://indianexpress.com/article/elections-2016/india/india-news-india/west-bengal-elections-post-
poll-violence-cpim-left-parties-biman-bose-2799552/  
xi Indicators about multiple aspects of Indian elections can be found in the surveys of views of election 
experts collected by the Electoral Integrity Project, see for example 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/EWYTZ7 for the May 
2017 survey data. 
xii  https://indiaevm.org 
xiii http://www.ceo.kerala.gov.in/home.html;jsessionid=8A69DC57CE1B496E2F5B6EA58A5B7D14.   
xiv https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/  
xv Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are various groups of historically disadvantaged people 
in the Indian society. Terms for their recognition are set in the Constitution, and a system of 
reservations is in place for them. 
xvi http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2017/01/17/blocking-the-introduction-of-the-totaliser-is-not-good-for-
the-secret-ballot-in-india/.   
xvii http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-editorials/evms-win-politicians-making-wild-allegations-
against-evms-totally-fail-to-back-these-up/  
